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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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"Are we looking ahead at all and making up our minds what we shall do
if there is a complete Polish collapse and if Poland is over-run by the
Bolshevik armies . . , Would it be the policy of the British Government to
remain impassive in the face of such an event... In the event of the collapse
of Polandj, what reaction would this situation entail upon the German posi-
tion ? It would clearly not be possible to disarm Germany if her eastern
frontiers were in contact with a Bolshevised area . . . "
The main point of Churchill's speech was <c territorial changes on the
frontiers of Poland there will have to be." In other words'/the British
Prime Minister again entirely supported Russia's aggressive demand,
thereby completely ignoring the explicit clauses of the Anglo-Polish
Treaty. And, the justification for this thrusting aside of England's com-
mitments was taken from the arsenal of power politics. It can be logically
assumed that, employing these reasons, Britain ought to have claimed
" half France, Italy, Belgium and Holland, since, after all, she also had
the right to be rewarded for her unique effort in the liberation of these
countries," commented the World Press.
Churchill's speech was obviously made for the benefit of Moscow,
otherwise it would be difficult to understand why it had been made at all.
Ignoring the empty phraseology regarding a <c strong, sovereign and in-
dependent Poland,5' after a pattern cut by Moscow, it merely proved to
be a clearly expressed and unmasked consent to the partition of Poland,
and more than that, of her insertion as a whole into the Russian political
system. This was a new step in British policy. The submission of the
remainder of Poland was to be camouflaged under Moscow's scheme of a
" United Polish Government" having " the confidence of the three
Great Powers concerned." It is difficult to visualise any * protected *
Government who could possess thee confidence ' of two democratic states,
and a totalitarian one at the same time. Once in the past Poland had
indeed possessed a similar government in the carcase of the state left to it
by the Vienna Congress, a government which had had the confidence of
Russia. This State known as * Congress Poland/ had been united with
Russia under the sceptre of the Tsar and, guaranteed by the other Powers,
was only to benefit from this c confidence' for a mere fifteen years, after
which it was finally liquidated. One of those c guarantors ' pressed to
intervene in this destruction of Poland, had answered, " We have the
right to intervene but we are not obliged to do so." The remark was made
by the Prime Minister of Britain at that time—it was Lord Palmerston.
Such international guarantees given to the smaller countries have proved
their worthlessness between the two great wars, and the present genera-
tion rated them at their true value. In the case of Poland, the promises
of the British Premier appeared problematical, for in them could be read
the renouncement of former pledges. He spoke only for Britain;
Washington's attitude was one of complete indifference at the time. The
question might be asked, was the Kremlin in agreement with Winston
Churchill on this matter ? Words have another interpretation in Moscow,